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Viewed as a geometric figure, the ant’s path is irregular, complex, hard to describe. But its
complexity is really a complexity in the surface of the beach, not a complexity in the ant.
(Herbert A. Simon 1957, p. 51)

When many problems demand concentrated attention at once—and this is always happening
in modern industrial society—reliance on the expert specialist is the only resource.
(John Maurice Clark 1918, p. 28)

I.

INTRODUCTION

As part of its recently revived commitment to correctly describing or prescribing human
economic affairs, economics has been aiming to achieve a single, widely-accepted, and
precise behavioral theory of choice. Simultaneously, there has been an increased interest in
economics in working with the idea that human rationality is bounded and thus theories
building around more realistic models of human actors. As pointed out by Herbert Simon, a
pioneer of this concept (Simon 1955, 1956), the idea that human rationality is bounded by
limitations has persisted from classical until modern times. Simon (2000), for example, cites
Voltaire’s statement in his Dictionaire Philosophique that “the best is the enemy of the good”
and points out that “in modern translation: ‘optimizing is the enemy of satisficing’”1 (p. 26).
In earlier work, Simon (1957) defines the principle of bounded rationality as follows: “The
capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is very small
compared with the size of the problems whose solution is required for objectively rational
behavior in the real world—or even for a reasonable approximation to such objective
rationality” (p. 158).
Almost a century ago, John Maurice Clark (1918) (son of John Bates Clark) put forward
interesting ideas about decision-making that are consistent with the concept of bounded
rationality and satisfaction. Most particularly, Clark stresses that decision making involves an
attention effort that cannot be sustained for long time because of limited cognitive capacity.
He links his discussion to works like Cooley’s Human Nature and Social Order, which refers
to the human tendency toward “protecting ourselves by some sort of mechanical control—
1

Simon (1957) coined the term “satisficing” replacing it with the goal of maximizing through finding
strategies or actions that are good enough. He argues that “organisms adapt well enough to ‘satisfice’;
they do not, in general, ‘optimize’” (Simon 1956, p. 129).
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some accepted personal authority, some local custom, some professional tradition, or the like.
Indeed, to know where and how to narrow the activity of the will in order to preserve its tone
and vigor for its most essential functions, is a great part of knowing how to live. An
incontinent exercise of choice wears people out, so that many break down and yield even
essentials to discipline and authority” (as cited in Clark 1918, p. 23). Clark also stresses that a
“good hedonist would stop calculating when it seemed likely to involve more trouble than it
was worth, and, as he could not in the nature of the case tell just when this point has been
reached, he would make no claim to exactness for his results” (p. 25).
Clark’s observations describe the avenue of our endeavor: to investigate whether a
higher level of complexity leads to an increased reliance on simple rules of thumb.
Specifically, we explore whether humans rely on the expert specialist as a rule of thumb
when many problems demand concentrated attention simultaneously, a topic on which, to our
surprise, there is little empirical evidence. A valid identification of whether humans follow
rules of thumb as a consequence of bounded rationality requires that (1) the variable
employed in their decisions is objectively measurable, (2) the decision itself is simple (ideally
dichotomous), inexpensive and frequently repeated, and (3) the rule is applied in a complex
environment. We study a natural experiment in voting across a period of 160 years (1848–
2009) which fulfills all these requirements.
In Switzerland—whose institutional environment has been stable since 1848—we
analyze constituent voting behavior using parliament as the expert specialist. We assume this
perception of expertise because in most modern democracies, the set of experts to which the
division of labor delegates the information-provider function includes politicians, interest
groups, the government, and/or professional information gatherers (Downs 1957). This
assumption is further supported by Grönlund and Setälä’s (2007) analysis of European Social
Survey (2002–2003) data, which finds that citizens in the Nordic countries, Switzerland, and
Luxembourg report the highest levels of trust in their national parliaments and have the
highest level of overall trust in political institutions. We therefore assume that parliament, as
a collective source of wisdom, may be more credible than a single politician. Citizens acquire
political information to help them decide how to vote. In Switzerland, the parliament always
offers an ex ante voting recommendation for referenda, a standard method of information
provision that enhances its image as expert consultant. We identify the effect of these public
parliamentary voting recommendations on constituents’ real choices (i.e., the revealed
preferences of both the constituents and parliament). Such voting decisions are influenced by
the actions of leaders, who provide help through informing voters about the issues (Shachar
2
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and Nalebuff 1999). Thus, the variable employed in the decision, i.e. parliament’s
recommendation, is observable and measurable. Moreover, referendum decisions represent
constituents with dichotomous choices which are inexpensive and frequently repeated adding
up to a total of 555 voting decisions thereby fulfilling a further central requirement of a valid
identification of the use of rules of thumb.
Most particularly, we use two ways of identifying complexity comparable to an
experimental setting that demands concentrated attention on several simple issues
simultaneously. First, to ensure careful selection of theoretically relevant behavior measures,
in constructing our dataset, we recognize that although parliament may always influence
constituent decision making somewhat, from our theoretical perspective, this influence is
likely to be larger when the number of referenda is higher than one, i.e. the rule of thumb is
more frequently used when more referenda are held. In Switzerland specifically, every
referendum is preceded by an open public discussion; however, such discussion is easier for
constituents to follow if they need only decide on a single issue and their attention is not
divided between two or more issues on the same day. Our setting allows us to distinguish
between days on which there is only one referendum and days on which two or more
referenda take place. If constituents follow a rule of thumb, we predict that when more
referenda are held on the same day, they will be more likely to refer to outside
recommendations in their decision-making. We therefore use the number of referenda per day
as a first measure of complexity to identify parliamentary influence on constituents’ choices.
Second, to further pinpoint this influence, determine whether constituents are bounded
in their rationality and therefore employ rules of thumb, we focus only on days with two or
more referenda. Because of systematic voter registration in Switzerland since 1884, we know
the number of voters and also the number of valid votes in referenda. We therefore know how
high the turnout was for all referenda on the very same day. As constituents incur the same
costs for turning up for the first referendum as for the second or third on the same day, we
can use differences in turnout within constituencies to identify which referendum on a given
day attracted the most attention. In particular, because even individuals that go to the polls do
not necessarily vote on all ballot issues (Crain, Leavens, and Abbot 1987), we identify the
referendum with the highest turnout of the day. Recognizing that constituents are more likely
to cast a vote for a referendum about which they are better informed, while some with little
information may still vote but rely more on parliamentary recommendation, we identify the
parliamentary influence by focusing on referenda with a relatively lower turnout on days on

3
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which more than one referendum was held. The strength of this empirical design is that we
can use the percentage of voter turnout to directly identify the voters’ focus of attention.
The article proceeds as follows: the next section provides a deeper discussion of this
methodology. Section III describes the data setting and identification strategy. Section IV
presents the empirical results, and Section V concludes.

II.

BOUNDED RATIONALITY

Economists’ increasing interest in bounded rationality is reflected in the fact that 44%
of the 825 articles published on this topic between 1996 and 2012 appear in economics
journals.2 Moreover, there has been also been an increased interest in economics in working
with theories of more realistic models of human behavior that in Simon’s (2000) words
“avoid over-simplification where it makes a consequential difference” (p. 30). Most
particularly, Simon (1992) claims that “to omit from economic theory a consideration of
human computational power is like omitting gravitational forces from astrophysical theory. In
a weightless world, or one with gravity shields, things would be quite different from the way
they are in the actual world. A theory for the former would have little predictive value in the
latter” (p. 26).
The research agenda, therefore, is to go beyond Milton Friedman’s (1953) assertion that
a theory cannot be judged by the realism of its assumptions but only by its efficacy in making
predictions.3 Neoclassical theory, Simon (1992) argues, is flawed in having no notable record
of correct predictions and, even where success has been claimed, a paucity of comparisons
with alternative theories.4 It is also unclear why unrealism is acceptable: “Among the
inferences that can be drawn from any theory, hence among its predictions, is the truth of its
assumptions. A theory can be falsified by falsifying its axioms as readily as it can be falsified
by falsifying any of the theorems that can be derived from the axioms. There is no support in
any system of logic with which I am familiar, or in any school of philosophy of science, for
Friedman’s principle of unrealism” (p. 36). Friedman’s error, Simon contends, may be
attributed to confusion between unrealism and approximation, a confusion he illustrates using

2
3
4

ISI Web of Knowledge on March 30 (2012).
See also Conlisk (1996) for a discussion of prominent arguments in favour of unbounded rationality.
In their eye-tracking study, Reutskaja et al. (2011) use an experimental design that is comparable to
consumer decisions in a modern supermarket. This design allows comparison of the efficacy of three
alternative dynamic search models: an optimal dynamic search with zero search costs, a satisficing
model, and a hybrid model in which subjects search for a random amount of time dependent on the value
of the goods seen and make the “best” choice. They conclude that the hybrid model performs best.
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Friedman’s example of Galileo neglecting air resistance when stating the law of falling
bodies: “…. air resistance can be ignored when studying the fall of bodies in a near-vacuum,
but not when designing parachutes. And in no case does a theory of approximation support
the principle of unrealism, that it doesn’t matter if the premises of a theory are false.
Unrealism is no virtue, and unless careful attention is given to the goodness of approximation
that is required, it can be fatal” (p. 37).
It is therefore not surprising that bounded rationality has become more dominant in
recent years. For example, in a revised version of the Nobel lecture delivered in Stockholm
on December 8, 2002, Kahneman (2003) explains that his research team was attempting “to
obtain a map of bounded rationality by exploring the systematic biases that separate the
beliefs that people have and the choices assumed in rational-agent models” (p. 1449). Conlisk
(1996) provides a nice overview of a large set of models that allow for bounded rationality.
Baumol (2004), who attended the debate between Herbert Simon and Milton Friedman on the
role of rational calculation in economic decisions, recalls the exchange: “Milton criticized
that satisficing was just a form of camouflaged rationality, entailing a careful weighing of the
costs of improved information and that of more sophisticated calculation, while Herb
responded that this view dodged the substance of the issue, simply incorporating the one
position into the other by terminological sleight of hand” (p. 58). These different lines of
argument led to Baumol and Quandt’s (1964) paper on the rationality of following rules of
thumb, which leads to what they term “optimally imperfect decision making”.
In the context of our paper, Simon (1986) claims that to “predict how a voter, even a
voter motivated solely by concern for his or her economic well-being, will vote requires
much more than assuming utility maximization… In any model of voting behavior that has
any prospect of predicting behavior, almost all the action will lie in these auxiliary
assumptions about attention and belief that define the decision maker’s frame” (p. S217).
Because our study analyzes the outcomes of different referenda on precisely the same day,
we must take into account that people are endowed with a narrow capacity for simultaneous
attention to different pieces of information (Simon 1983). In other words, humans can only
deal with a limited number of problems at one time.
A key strength and advantage of our experimental context, therefore, is that we can
observe the nature of the attention outcome using voter turnout over a very long period (160
years covering 555 referendum decisions) while still holding the setting (referenda) constant.
While the changing shape of the decision-making environment may have influenced human
goal-directed behavior over time (Simon 1996), our setting remains constant. Over the 1605
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year sample period, for example, citizens have grown up in very different social
environments, with different knowledge, information, and social norms. Nonetheless, the
same basic decision making rule is applied in complex situations which points to the
identification of a common invariant of human behavior in decision making. To the best of
our knowledge, there are as yet no studies that explore bounded rationality in such a real
world setting over such a long time span.
Our natural experiment, we believe, is very well specified to derive empirical insights
on the consequences of bounded rationality. Using voter turnout, we can directly measure
which issue received more attention and offer a clear explanatory heuristic for the decision
process mechanism. The limits of attention stem from people’s inability to think about lot of
things at the same time (Simon 1983). We can thus provide an answer not only on what
decisions are made but also how they are made, thereby offering empirical evidence on
procedural rationality and contributing to empirical knowledge on decision processes. Simon
(1996) refers to such heuristic searching as a selective search using rules of thumb to find
decisions that satisfice (p. 27)5.
To obtain a clear picture of how people vote, we postulate a simple heuristic mechanism
enforced through habit and rule-governed behavior, one that can potentially identify the
invariants of human behavior, particularly over a very long time span. In such a changing
environment, adaptive individuals faced with complexity are likely to apply the same simple
decision-making rules and habits, i.e. the essence is limited computational capacity in
complex or extensive decision environment rather than just scarcity of cost information
(Hodgson 1997). However, whereas Hodgson (1997) sees the problem of handling large
amounts of information in terms of the net cost of obtaining it, in our case, extensiveness is
less of an issue because parliamentary recommendations are readily visible in a
booklet/pamphlet sent to voters prior to a referendum. In other words, most of the
information needed for decision making is simply placed into the voters’ hands. On the other
hand, complexity, which Hodgson defines as “the density of structural linkages and
interactions between the parts of an interdependent system” (p. 669), is important for our
study because individuals effectively have computational limitations when interpreting
information received (Simon 1990). In fact, complexity in the cost function or other
environmental constraints can be so great that bounded rationality becomes important as
actors fail to calculate the best course of action (Simon 1972).

5

For a detailed discussion on heuristics see Gigerenzer et al. (2011).
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The challenge, therefore, lies in analyzing and using the information. Because the
process of satisficing uses experience to construct an expectation of solution goodness
(Simon 1990), while habit formation internalizes the decision process as an invariant of
human behavior, introducing a model of satisficing behavior can greatly enhance
understanding of how a decision or equilibrium is reached (Simon 1959).
We, in line with Clark (1918), argue that complexity produces a rule of thumb that
constituents are more likely to follow parliamentary recommendations because parliament,
being elected by constituents, is supposed to represent them and could be seen as experts.
Voters may also believe that (in the aggregate) politicians and parliament as a whole act in
the public’s best interest. Hence, a rule of thumb that says “follow the recommendation of the
parliament when complexity increases” is comprehensible. It also conforms to Simon’s
(1996) argument that “we should not look for great complexity in the laws governing human
behavior, in situations where the behavior is truly simple and only its environment is
complex” (p. 68). In fact, our setting conforms to the central characteristics of a rule of thumb
(see Baumol and Quandt 1964, p. 24). First, the variable employed in the decision—whether
or not to follow parliaments’ suggestion—is objectively measurable. Second, the decision is
simple, inexpensive, and well suited to frequent repetition (i.e., frequent referenda among
constituents). We therefore argue that when faced with information difficulties (a complex
environment), constituents apply a simple decision-making rule.

III.

DATA SETTING AND IDENTIFICATION
Institutional Setting

Switzerland’s federal constitution, which dates back to 1848, was basically modeled on
the constitution of the United States. The Swiss parliament is made up of two houses, the
National Council (Nationalrat), comparable to U.S. House of Representatives, and the
Council of States (Ständerat), comparable to the U.S. Senate, and the parliamentary electoral
districts comprise 26 constituencies (cantons or subnational jurisdictions). Switzerland’s
parliamentary system is one of direct democracy that, like over half of U.S. states, allows the
holding of referenda. Not only may citizens from the 26 different constituencies challenge
any law that has been passed by parliament, but a referendum is always mandatory if a
parliamentary legislative proposal aims to change the constitution. Citizens themselves may
also demand a constitutional amendment by referendum/initiative, a request that cannot be
refused by the government and parliament unless it violates formal rules (see Portmann et al.
7
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2012 for details). Parliament can, however, work out a direct counterproposal, which is
presented to the voters at the same time as the citizen-driven initiative.6

Figure 1: Total number of referenda and referendum days from 1848 to 2009

Panel (a): Total number of referenda
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Panel (b): Average number of referenda per day
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Notes: First referendum was held in 1848.

6

A counterproposal is usually designed to be a compromise between the current status quo and the
demands in the initiative (see Stadelmann et al. 2012). We separately control for counterproposals in our
empirical setting.
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The results of a referendum, an instrument used constantly in Switzerland since 1848,
not only determine policy outcomes, they also reflect citizen preference for these outcomes.
More precisely, as pointed out by Schneider, Pommerehne, and Frey (1981) or Frey 1994,
referenda permit the majority to rank the policy outcomes that will be generated by the
proposed laws against the status quo. They thus present dichotomous results that indicate
what a majority prefers and, consequently, what the median constituent prefers (see Frey
1994 or Eichenberger et al. 2012).
Figure 1, panel (a), summarizes the number of referenda per decade in our dataset from
1848 until the beginning of 2009. The ability to exploit such a large set of field data to
identify revealed preferences and demonstrate how human problem solving and decision
making takes place in a complex environment is a key strength of this paper. Since 1848,
Swiss citizens have been presented with 520 unique federal referenda and 35 decisions with
counterproposals, resulting in a total of 555 referenda. In terms of our dataset’s time
dimension, which spans three centuries, it is worth noting that 1848 is not very far away from
1789 when the U.S. Constitution became the basis for the United States federal government,
only 12 years before Abraham Lincoln’s election as President, and only 15 years before the
Emancipation Proclamation freed slaves and gave them voting rights.
In issuing its voting recommendation for each referendum, the Swiss federal parliament
naturally recommends acceptance for its own initiatives but usually suggests rejection for
citizen-initiated referenda. Constituents for their part are generally well informed about
parliamentary recommendations and the issues to be decided by referendum because of
booklets/pamphlets sent out to voters before the election. This practice was formally initiated
in 1877 when the federal council argued for giving constituents an official manifest that
details the legislative proposal submitted for referendum. Parliament then entrusted the
federal council with “officially and objectively informing citizens on the reasons for the
referendum and how parliament formed its opinion” (translated from the German, see the
appendix, Figure S1). As the federal council’s address to parliament makes clear, even in the
decades before 1877, voters were informed by the media about parliament’s position, and as
early as 1874, the federal council itself was officially disseminating such information (see
BBl 1874 I 497). Thus, even when voters did not necessarily fully understand the precise
issue of a referendum, they did at least know parliament’s position.
Except for the very first referendum on June 6, 1848, all referenda have been held on a
Sunday. Usually, according to our data, voters go to the polls between one and four days a
9
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year7 to decide between a minimum of one and a maximum of nine distinct referenda issues.8
Panel (b) of Figure 1 shows the average number of referenda per day for all decades since
1848. This number remained stable from 1870 to the 1960s and then increased slightly.

Figure 2: Number of referenda on the same day from 1848 to 2009

Panel (a): from 1848 to 2009
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7

8

Only in 1952, 1958, and 1985 were voters asked to go to the polls on 7, 5, and 5 days per year,
respectively.
Although voters usually decide on five or fewer referenda the same day, since 1848, nine referenda
decisions on the same day occurred on January 14, 1866, and May 18, 2003. Eight referenda decisions in
one day has never been registered, and seven referenda decisions on one day only occurred on May 17,
1992.
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Figure 2, panel (a), provides a histogram of the number of referenda per day excluding
counterproposals, excluded because they are presented together with the original referendum,
making the referendum a multiple decision between either the status quo, the proposed
initiative, or the counterproposal.
During the current and past two centuries, there have been over 125 instances of days
on which exactly one referendum was held; the remainder are days on which two or more
referenda were voted on. By splitting these observations into subsamples before and after
1945 (see panels (b) and (c) of Figure 2), we show that the total number of referenda held the
same day has changed over time. Before 1946, voters were more often asked to decide on a
single referendum on one day, whereas from 1946 onward, the custom was rather two
referenda on one day. In the empirical analysis, we account for such gradual long-term
changes over the centuries by including decade fixed effects and exploring these time periods
separately. All additional variables employed in the analysis, their sources, and a number of
descriptive statistics are given in appendix Table A1.

Identification of Parliamentary Influence
We use our natural experimental setting across a 160-year time span to assess whether
constituents’ bounded rationality throws light on voting behavior; in particular, whether
complexity increases voter reliance on simple rules of thumb, i.e. ”follow the expert”, in this
case, “follow parliament”. We anticipate that introducing the concept of satisficing goals may
be linked to a stronger inclination to trust and rely on experts. For example, Morton and
Tyran (2010) observe in a laboratory experimental setting that voters with low quality
information seem to follow the rule of thumb of “letting the experts decide” (p. 41). In other
words, they show that less informed voters delegate their votes to more informed voters even
when it is not suboptimal to do so. This reliance on an expert once the task becomes more
complex can be a normal practice that is enforced by habit and regularities of behavior
(behavioral rules). Indeed, Heiner (1983) argues that behavioral rules arise because of some
uncertainty as individuals distinguish between preferred and less preferred behavior. Such
uncertainty leads to mechanisms that restrict flexibility in choosing potential actions, which
results in selective attention to information.
To identify the effect of parliament’s voting recommendation on constituents’ real
choices, therefore, we first distinguish between days when there is only one referendum and

11
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days when more than one referendum takes place. Although we note that parliament might
always have some influence on how constituents decide, we anticipate that parliament’s
influence will be larger when the number of referenda per day is higher than one. As
previously discussed, the open public discussion that takes place before every referendum is
easier to follow when constituents need only decide on a single issue, meaning that their
attention is not divided between two or more issues that must be settled on the very same day.
When faced with such decisions, Simon (1983) argues, “we all feel the overwhelming
difficulty of being appropriately informed. But we do have ways of dealing with that
difficulty, in matters of public policy as in matters of medicine or plumbing: we turn to
experts. When we can’t establish the relevant facts, we look for an expert who knows them
and we listen to what he has to say. Sometimes we even take his advice without asking to
have it fully explained” (pp. 94–95). The strength of our setting is that the constituents do not
have to seek out experts or justify why these experts are credible, legitimate, or even likely to
be right. Rather, we deal with the issue of alternative experts by including interest group
voting recommendations since 1945, before which such recommendations were not officially
available or collected.9
It is clear that when more referenda are held on the same day, constituents are more
likely to refer to outside help and recommendations in making their decisions. Hence, we
identify the parliamentary influence on constituent choices using the number of referenda
held on the same day and then measure the influence of these recommendations on rationally
bounded constituents by focusing only on days on which two or more referenda take place.
As mentioned we know the turnout for all referenda on the same day since 1884, so, because
constituents incur the same costs for more referenda on the same day as for one, we can use
differences in turnout within constituencies to identify which referendum on a given day
attracted the most constituent attention and had the highest turnout. Likewise, if better
informed constituents are more likely to cast a vote, relatively less informed constituents are
not but may cast a vote based heavily on parliamentary recommendation. We can therefore
identify the parliamentary influence by examining the outcomes of referenda with relatively
lower turnout on days when more than one referendum was held. Such an assumption is valid

9

Simon (1983) raises the question of how we ensure that parliamentary members’ own interests do not
color the advice they give. In Switzerland, members of parliament are routinely required to disclose
financial and economic ties or responsibilities that might lead to a conflict of interest. Simon, however,
also refers to an element that is directly linked to human bounded rationality, namely if a person
becomes involved in a particular activity, devoting a lot of time to that activity, she or he will assign it a
greater value than without involvement.
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because focus of attention is a major determinant of choice and a key mechanism of bounded
rationality (Simon 1983). A key advantage of our setting, therefore, is that we can identify the
voters’ focus as they simultaneously express their preferences in the ballot box.
Finally, the structure of the natural experiment solves potential causality problems.
Parliament issues its voting recommendation before constituents decide on precisely the same
topic. The official pamphlet sent to voters clearly highlights parliament’s recommendation
and explains the topic of each referendum separately including the legislative changes to laws
or the constitution. Whether one or more referenda are presented on the same day depends on
the number of legislative and constitutional issues that parliament decided on and the highest
voting turnout identifies the referendum which received the highest attention in the public
discussion before the referendum took place. Thus, complexity is also exogenously
determined by the number of referenda on the same day and the focus of attention defined by
the referendum with the highest turnout. On voting day constituents go to the polls and decide
which referendum to accept and which to reject knowing parliament’s recommendation and
knowing which referendum issue has their focus of attention. Our setting allows therefore to
test the simple rule of thumb: “when complexity increases, follow parliament”.

IV.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF A NATURAL EXPERIMENT
Baseline Results

The main results from our analysis of 160 years of data are given in Table 1.

Table 1: Natural setting since 1848: Average probability of constituents accepting a referendum dependent
on parliamentary recommendation and number of referenda the same day
Parliament suggests NO

Parliament suggests YES

First difference

Only one referendum a
day

17.750***
(1.191)

60.439***
(0.935)

42.689***
(1.514)

More than one
referendum a day

12.295***
(0.584)

65.402***
(0.561)

53.108***
(0.810)

-5.455***
(1.326)

4.963***
(1.090)

10.419***
(1.718)

Notes: Values represent the average probability in percentages that constituents will accept a referendum, the first differences, and the
difference in difference. Values in parentheses are standard errors. ***, **, and * indicate a mean significance level of below 1 %, between 1
and 5 %, and between 5 and 10 %, respectively.

It is first worth noting that exploring such a long time period reduces the relevance of
referenda type (topic) or the influence of particular parties. Rather, we analyze the probability
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of a constituency accepting a referendum dependent on whether parliament recommends a
yes or no vote and whether there is only one or more than one referendum that day. If
constituents are rationally bounded, they should react more to parliamentary recommendation
when their attention is divided among several issues. This theoretical expectation corresponds
exactly with our observations from the natural experiment. The probability of a constituency
accepting a single referendum on a given day is 17.75% when parliament recommends a no
vote but is 42.69 percentage points higher at 60.44% when parliament recommends a yes
vote.10 However, the influence of parliament is even greater when there is more than one
referendum per day: the probability of a constituency accepting a referendum falls to 12.30%
when parliament recommends rejection but increases to 65.40 % when parliament suggests
acceptance. Thus, when there is more than one referendum on the same day, the difference in
probability is approximately 53.12 and the difference in difference is approximately 10.42
percentage points. Put differently, when constituents must decide on more than one issue, the
influence of parliamentary recommendation is 10.42 percentage points higher, which is
consistent with the argument that people are rationally bounded and refer to
recommendations when the number of issues increases. We also note that the influence of
parliament increases symmetrically in more complex voting situations: If parliament suggests
to vote no the probability that constituents really vote yes drops by 5.45 percentage points
from 17.75 % to 12.30 % when more than one referendum per day is held while a
recommendation to vote yes by parliament increases the probability that constituents vote yes
by 4.96 percentage points from 60.44 % in the case of a single referendum a day to 65.40
when more than one referendum per day is held. If constituents are rationally bounded we
would precisely expect such a symmetric influence of the rule of thumb to follow parliament
in more complex situations for yes and no recommendations.

10

This change in the yes vote may indicate that parliament has already an influence on voters. However, it
may also indicate that parliament suggests a yes vote for sensible issues where voters would have voted
yes in any case. Our natural experiment only allows us to determine whether the influence of parliament
increases when complexity increases too and constituents rely on simple rules of thumb.
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Table 2: Parliamentary influence on constituent referenda choices

Identification: More than one referendum

Identification: Low turnout referendum

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

Years covered

1848-2009

1848-2009

1848-2009

1884-2009

1884-2009

1884-2009

1884-2009

1884-2009

1884-2009

Parliament suggests YES

1.9955***
(0.1051)

2.0107***
(0.1052)

2.1695***
(0.1119)

2.1190***
(0.1067)

2.1548***
(0.1119)

2.4834***
(0.1212)

2.5322***
(0.1236)

2.5480***
(0.1261)

2.5485***
(0.1227)

(Parliament suggests YES) * (More than
one referendum)

0.6559***
(0.0857)

0.6608***
(0.0858)

0.5883***
(0.0950)

0.6050***
(0.0889)

0.5699***
(0.0958)

More than one referendum

-0.4445***
(0.0735)

-0.4446***
(0.0735)

-0.4734***
(0.0810)

-0.5583***
(0.0765)

-0.4868***
(0.0818)
0.4010***
(0.1113)

0.3827***
(0.1121)

0.3234***
(0.1098)

0.2956***
(0.1140)

-0.1201
(0.1013)

-0.1188
(0.1013)

-0.1013
(0.1008)

-0.0689
(0.1014)

0.0574***
(0.0107)

0.0559***
(0.0107)

0.0464***
(0.0107)

0.0748***
(0.0143)

-0.3487***
(0.0511)

-0.4157***
(0.0488)

-0.4030***
(0.0514)

-1.6723***
(0.2416)

-1.4259***
(0.2443)

(Parliament suggests YES) * (Low
turnout referendum)
Low turnout referendum
Number of referenda the same day
Counterproposal

-0.2022***
(0.0626)

-0.2180***
(0.0508)

Turnout
Intercept

-0.3666***
(0.0491)

-0.3064***
(0.0472)

-2.2348***
(0.1927)

-1.9953***
(0.1981)

-1.6792***
(0.0813)

-1.6793***
(0.0813)

-1.5177***
(0.3973)

-0.4186***
(0.1265)

-0.7479***
(0.2284)

-2.3166***
(0.1156)

-2.3119***
(0.1154)

-1.4550***
(0.1676)

-2.6057***
(0.3401)

Cantonal Fixed Effects
Decade Fixed Effects
DE Parliament suggests YES
DE (Parliament suggests YES) * (More
than one referendum)
DE (Parliament suggests YES) * (Low
turnout referendum)
Sample restriction

YES
NO
45.85
11.37

YES
NO
46.17
11.43

YES
YES
49.18
9.36

YES
NO
48.43
10.55

YES
YES
49.14
9.32

YES
NO
53.40

YES
NO
54.43

YES
NO
55.52

YES
YES
53.58

7.18

6.73

5.56

5.57

R2
Brier
No. Obs.

0.2958
0.1929
14127

>1
referendum
0.3339
0.1839
9961

>1
referendum
0.3502
0.1808
9961

>1
referendum
0.3567
0.1792
9961

>1
referendum
0.3671
0.1765
9961

0.2964
0.1928
14127

0.325
0.1862
14127

0.3309
0.1846
13502

0.3445
0.1817
13502

Notes: The dependent variable for all logit estimations is "Constituency accepts referendum." Robust clustered standard errors for cantons (constituencies) are reported throughout the table. DE stands for discrete effect in
the predicted probability. The effects for "Parliament suggests YES", "(Parliament suggests YES) * (Low turnout referendum)", "(Parliament suggests YES) * (More than one referendum)" represent discrete effects in
percentage points for these coefficients when all other variables are evaluated at their median values. The evaluation of the interaction terms follows Ai and Norton (2001). ***, **, and * indicate a mean significance level of
below 1 %, between 1 and 5 %, and between 5 and 10 %, respectively.

15
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper721

16

Stadelmann and Torgler: Bounded Rationality and Voting Decisions Exploring a 160-Yea

As shown in Table 2, a very similar picture emerges for a logit model analysis of the
probability that a constituency will accept a referendum. Here, the dependent variable, used
in all the remaining tables, is constituency acceptance of the referendum. For each of the
specifications, we report robust standard errors clustered by constituency.11 We also calculate
discrete effects for the influence of parliamentary recommendation and the interaction terms,
while holding all other variables fixed at their medians.12 It is also important to note that we
count counterproposals and initiatives as one single referendum but include their
acceptance/rejection in the data.
Specification (1) is a natural experimental setting similar to that reported in Table 1.
The pseudo R2 is very high for a logit model (and indeed for this type of analysis) even
though the model includes no other controls apart from cantonal dummies. In this analysis,
omitted variable biases are of little importance because we are only interested in the
interaction term. Only the interaction term gives us the causal influence of parliament’s
recommendation in more complex voting situations. Thus, any variable not present in the
estimations could only be characterized as omitted if it would influence the interaction term
directly. We control for such potential influences in further estimates and refinements. As
shown in Table 2, the interaction term is highly statistically significant at the 1% level with a
positive sign. Thus, when there are more referenda per day, the parliamentary influence on
constituent decisions is larger. Specifically, the discrete effects show that when there is only a
single referendum proposed, constituents are 45.85 percentage points more likely to vote yes,
while the interaction term indicates that this effect increases by 11.37 percentage points for
more than one referendum.
Specification (2) includes a dummy for counterproposals to ensure that the observed
effects are not a consequence of different reactions to parliament when there are more
referenda and one is a counterproposal. Including the counterproposal variable, however, has
barely any effect on our key variables (in fact, the quantitative effect is even a little larger).
Specification (3) introduces decade dummies to represent technological and environmental
changes that have reduced the transaction costs of information, potential changes in voter
characteristics (e.g., average level of education), or simply a shift to more referenda over
time. Other changes that justify the use of such time dummies include granting women the
right to vote at the federal level in 1971 and the emergence of the new canton of Jura in 1979
11

Observations are clustered by constituency in recognition of the likelihood that observations in the same
constituency are not independent.
12
For correct evaluation of the interaction term in logistic models, we follow Ai and Norton (2003).
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(first referendum February 18, 1979). The coefficient of the interaction term, however,
remains statistically positively significant with a comparable discrete effect.
Specification (4) then restricts the sample to the 1884–2009 period to reflect the fact
that voter turnout data are only available from 1884 (before which there was no systematic
registration of either the electorate or the number of valid votes). Turnout not only measures
voters’ level of interest or how well informed they are, it also covers such aspects as
environmental conditions (e.g., weather). Hence, it is valuable to control for voter turnout in
case voters simply do not turn up when they are not well informed, particularly when there is
more than one referendum. Our results indicate that turnout has no effect on the interaction
term, and the discrete effect even increases slightly to over 10 percentage points, i.e. when
more referenda are held the same day the influence of parliament’s recommendation on
constituents real choices is significantly higher. The base effect of turnout is also negative,
which may indicate that voters come to the polls if they disagree (the status quo bias). This
finding, however, should not affect our experimental setting, i.e. the higher effect of
parliament’s recommendation in more complex voting situations when constituents follow a
rule of thumb. Specification (5) incorporates decade fixed effects to control for technological
and environmental changes.
To reflect our second identification approach for the focus of attention, specifications
(6) to (9) include an interaction term based on the “referenda that do not have the highest
turnout on the same day” (low turnout referenda) rather than “more than one referendum.” As
always, because of data availability, the data sample begins in 1884 but by definition is
restricted to cases with more than one referendum per day. In line with the previous results,
the interaction term is positive, statistically significant and, at 7.18 percentage points, the
discrete effect is surprisingly large given the small discrete effect expected if voters informed
about only one referendum vote on no others. To ensure that the effects from the first
identification strategy do not overlap with those based on referenda with low turnout, we also
take into account “number of referenda the same day”. In line with the earlier analysis, we
include the counterproposals in specification (7), check for the effects of the turnout itself in
specification (8) and (9) and in (9) we include decade fixed effects. Throughout all the
estimations reported in Table 2, the interaction term is statistically significant at the 1% level
with a discrete effect between 5.56 and 7.18 percentage points. All the remaining estimations
always include cantonal and decade fixed effects.
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Robustness
Table 3 reports the results of our robustness tests. The first takes into account that the
government’s

executive council

(the

federal

council)

also

frequently makes

a

recommendation on a referendum, meaning that constituents may not only be influenced by
parliament. For example, in three cases during our sample period, there was disagreement
between the government and parliament. Even if we exclude these three cases, however, our
results do not change. More important, in many cases, the government remains neutral and
expresses no preference (no position), so we examine voter responses to such a situation to
gage whether constituents react to politician suggestions in general or only to the government
or parliament.
Specification (1) uses a sample that begins in 1848 and includes an interaction term
between government neutrality and our “more than one referendum” identifier. The results
entirely confirm our expectation that constituents will react more to a neutral position if there
is more than one referendum: The interaction term between “parliament suggests a yes vote”
and “more than one referendum” remains highly statistically significant and positive, with a
large discrete effect (14.32 percentage points) while the interaction term for “government
neutral” and “more than one referendum” is both small and insignificant. Specification (2)
employs a sample that starts in 1884 and includes turnout. The quantitative effects barely
change for parliament’s recommendation and the interaction term for “government neutral”
and “more than one referendum” remains insignificant. Finally, specification (3) analyzes
those referenda that do not have the highest turnout, restricting the sample (as before) to days
with more than one referendum. Again, the interaction term for the government is not
statistically significant, but the interaction term between for the parliamentary influence is
highly significant and positive.
If politicians are in fact aware that their constituents are rationally bounded and more
likely to follow parliamentary recommendations when there are more referenda on the same
day, they may select to bundle referenda; particularly, if they are unsure whether the proposal
will pass. If this really is the case, we should actually observe no differences because
parliament’s recommendations should be the same everywhere. Thus, if politicians actually
do select the referendum day to increase the power of their recommendations, the effects
measured so far would represent a lower bound estimate for the influence of parliament and
the represent in any case evidence that constituents follow a rule of thumb.
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Table 3: Parliamentary influence on constituent referenda when government is neutral and members of
parliament offer divergent suggestions

Government neutral position

25% or more of members of parliament
have diverging suggestion

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Years covered

1848-2009

1884-2009

1884-2009

1848-2009

1884-2009

1884-2009

Parliament suggests YES

1.8476***
(0.1052)

1.8610***
(0.1106)

2.4782***
(0.1274)

1.1985***
(0.2866)

1.1962***
(0.3102)

1.9922***
(0.1685)

(Parliament suggests YES) *
(More than one referendum)

0.8278***
(0.0930)

0.7789***
(0.0968)

1.3938***
(0.3106)

1.3801***
(0.3328)

More than one referendum

-0.6865***
(0.0850)

-0.6836***
(0.0855)

-0.7964***
(0.2155)

-0.7217***
(0.2241)

(Parliament suggests YES) *
(Low turnout referendum)

0.2859**
(0.1215)

0.9889***
(0.1576)

Low turnout referendum

-0.0939
(0.0996)

-0.5107***
(0.1249)

(Government neutral) * (More
than one referendum)

0.0037
(0.0698)

0.0071
(0.0724)

(Government neutral) * (Low
turnout referendum)
Government neutral

0.0067
(0.0805)
0.8814***
(0.0671)

0.8572***
(0.0680)

Number of referenda the same
day
Counterproposal

0.8751***
(0.0624)
0.0911***
(0.0145)

-0.4327***
(0.0506)

Turnout
Cantonal Fixed Effects
Decade Fixed Effects
DE Parliament suggests YES
DE (Parliament suggests YES) *
(More than one referendum)
DE (Parliament suggests YES) *
(Low turnout referendum)
Sample restriction

YES
YES
43.15
14.32

R2
Brier
No. Obs.

0.3426
0.1825
14127

-0.5017***
(0.0496)

-0.5541***
(0.0540)

-1.7264***
(0.1884)

-1.1955***
(0.2356)

YES
YES
43.43
13.74

YES
YES
52.59

0.3602
0.1784
13502

-0.0083
(0.0187)
-0.4181***
(0.0652)

YES
YES
28.00
26.59

-0.4439***
(0.0641)

-0.4557***
(0.0682)

-1.0280**
(0.4461)

0.0283
(0.4550)

YES
YES
27.63
26.78

YES
YES
43.04

5.22

16.80

>1
referendum
0.3792
0.1741
9961

>1
referendum
0.3657
0.1709
3698

0.3254
0.1771
4379

0.3382
0.1745
4229

Notes: The dependent variable for all logit estimations is "Constituency accepts referendum". Robust clustered standard errors for cantons
(constituencies) are reported throughout the table. An intercept is always included. DE stands for discrete effect in the predicted probability.
The effects for "Parliament suggests YES", "(Parliament suggests YES) * (Low turnout referendum)", "(Parliament suggests YES) * (More than
one referendum)" represent discrete effects in percentage points for these coefficients when all other variables are evaluated at their median
values. The evaluation of the interaction terms follows Ai and Norton (2001). ***, **, and *indicate a mean significance level of below 1 %,
between 1 and 5 %; and between 5 and 10 %, respectively.

It may also be, however, that minorities in parliament might try to set the referendum
day in their own favor; that is, in such a way that their position has more power than the
parliamentary majority’s. To take these potential strategic behaviors into account, we look at
the majority by which parliament passed legislative proposals. The primary methodological
problem is that systematic recording of the number of parliamentary members voting yes/no
only began with the introduction of an electronic voting system in 1996, so for data before
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this, we had to refer to national council’s collected stenographic protocols and records of
which politicians voted for and against a proposal. Stenographic protocols, however,
particularly up until 1870 and between 1930 and 1945, do not always mention the exact
majorities, only the final parliamentary decision. Hence, we have no information on the exact
majorities in a total of 113 cases.
To determine whether minority positions led parliament to strategically bundle
referenda on the same day, specification (4) restricts the analysis only to recommendations on
which 25% or more of members of parliament disagreed. Not only is the interaction term
significant and positive but the discrete effect is higher than before. Thus, it is not the
minorities who bundle/unbundle referenda on a single day; rather, they may only prevent the
majority from strategically scheduling more referenda on the same day. This interpretation
would explain why we now also find a higher effect of the influence of the parliamentary
majority (i.e., parliamentary recommendation). Both specification (5), which uses data from
1884 onward, and specification (6), which analyzes referenda with low turnout (in line with
specification (3)), also return a higher discrete effect.
We now explore different time periods and present the results in Table 4. In
specifications (1) to (3), we exclude World War I and II, as those years represent exceptional
circumstances. Such exclusion, however, has no effect on our key results. In specifications
(4) to (5), we look at a more recent time period (1946 to 2009), a very stable era in
Switzerland with good economic growth, increased wealth, and stable institutions. Although
all interaction terms are significant, the discrete effect in specification (4) is relatively
smaller, most probably because of the post-1945 tendency to hold more referenda on one day
(see previous figures). Yet this finding also implies that the effect of the interaction with “low
turnout referendum” should become more important, which is precisely the case—the
discrete effect is 6.51 percentage points compared to around 5 percentage points in earlier
estimates. Specifications (6) to (8) focus on the period up until 1945. Specification (6)
produces the now typical result: the discrete effect is again higher because of a reference
group with a sufficient number of observations (see Figure 2, panel b). In specification (7),
however, for the first time, the interaction effect between “Parliament suggests YES” and
“Low turnout referendum” is not statistically significant. We assume two possible reasons for
this result: (1) the sample is comparatively small or (2) the instances of two or more referenda
before 1945 are few, so low turnout referenda are identified mostly on days with two
referenda. We solve this bias in specification (8) by controlling for days with only one
referendum.
20
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Table 4: Robustness tests with different periods - Influence of Parliament on constituents' choices in referenda

Without World War I and World War II

From 1946 to 2009

From 1884 to 1945

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

Years covered

1848-2009

1884-2009

1884-2009

1945-2009

1945-2009

1884-1945

1884-1945

1884-1945

Parliament suggests YES

2.2389***
(0.1235)

2.2305***
(0.1239)

2.5415***
(0.1230)

2.5505***
(0.1555)

2.5790***
(0.1287)

1.5306***
(0.1833)

2.0152***
(0.2363)

1.6656***
(0.1702)

(Parliament suggests YES) * (More than one
referendum)

0.5246***
(0.0933)

0.4945***
(0.0934)

0.2557**
(0.1202)

0.7568***
(0.1812)

More than one referendum

-0.4215***
(0.0834)

-0.4271***
(0.0842)

-0.1953
(0.1211)

-0.7927***
(0.1490)

(Parliament suggests YES) * (Low turnout
referendum)

0.2889**
(0.1137)

0.3156***
(0.1162)

0.1186
(0.2419)

0.6062***
(0.1695)

Low turnout referendum

-0.0468
(0.1011)

-0.0129
(0.1019)

-0.3216
(0.2323)

-0.7438***
(0.1652)

0.0734***
(0.0143)

0.0853***
(0.0150)

-1.1675***
(0.1133)

-0.9466***
(0.1283)

Number of referenda the same day
Exactly one referendum per day
Counterproposal

-1.3179***
(0.1752)
-0.3439***
(0.0514)

Turnout
Cantonal Fixed Effects
Decade Fixed Effects
DE Parliament suggests YES
DE (Parliament suggests YES) * (More than
one referendum)
DE (Parliament suggests YES) * (Low
turnout referendum)
Sample restriction
R2
Brier
No. Obs.

YES
YES
50.42
8.24

-0.4262***
(0.0478)

-0.4604***
(0.0535)

-0.5698***
(0.0549)

-0.5050***
(0.0589)

0.9836***
(0.1427)

0.7162***
(0.1896)

1.0211***
(0.1519)

-1.9745***
(0.2006)

-1.4116***
(0.2448)

-1.9797***
(0.3172)

-1.7267***
(0.3806)

-2.1293***
(0.3014)

-1.0739**
(0.5206)

-2.0597***
(0.3105)

YES
YES
50.52
7.96

YES
YES
53.40

YES
YES
55.62
3.82

YES
YES
53.48

YES
YES
36.50
13.57

YES
YES
44.48

YES
YES
39.37

3.89

9.80

> 1 referendum
0.3653
0.1781
1275

0.3079
0.1882
2925

5.63

0.323
0.1866
13652

0.3424
0.1822
13027

6.51

> 1 referendum
0.362
0.1776
9861

0.374
0.1753
10577

> 1 referendum
0.3801
0.1734
8686

0.2854
0.1922
2925

Notes: The dependent variable for all logit estimations is "Constituency accepts referendum". Robust clustered standard errors for cantons (constituencies) are reported throughout the table. An intercept is always
included. DE stands for discrete effect in the predicted probability. The effects for "Parliament suggests YES", "(Parliament suggests YES) * (Low turnout referendum)", "(Parliament suggests YES) * (More than one
referendum)" represent discrete effects in percentage points for these coefficients when all other variables are evaluated at their median values. The evaluation of the interaction terms follows Ai and Norton (2001).
***, **, and * indicate a mean significance level of below 1 %, between 1 and 5 %, and between 5 and 10 %, respectively.
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Table 5: Robustness tests using number of referenda on the same day

More than two referenda

More than three referenda

Number of
referenda

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Years covered

1848-2009

1884-2009

1848-2009

1884-2009

1848-2009

Parliament suggests YES

2.2565***
(0.0924)

2.7116***
(0.1709)

2.3509***
(0.0867)

2.5194***
(0.1566)

1.7403***
(0.0949)

(Parliament suggests YES) * (More
than two referenda)

0.7417***
(0.0765)

More than two referenda

-0.6557***
(0.0713)

(Parliament suggests YES) * (More
than three referenda)

0.8862***
(0.1130)

More than three referenda

-0.3541***
(0.0875)

(Parliament suggests YES) * (Number
of referenda the same day)

0.3103***
(0.0281)

Number of referenda the same day

0.1740***
(0.0229)

0.0850**
(0.0366)

(Parliament suggests YES) * (Low
turnout referendum)

0.5391***
(0.1538)

0.8113***
(0.1964)

-0.1951
(0.1260)

-0.2158
(0.1582)

Low turnout referendum
Exactly two referenda the same day

0.0786**
(0.0319)

Exactly two or three referenda the
same day
Counterproposal

-0.0437
(0.0326)
-0.2149***
(0.0506)

Turnout
Cantonal Fixed Effects
Decade Fixed Effects
DE Parliament suggests YES
DE (Parliament suggests YES) * (More
than two referenda)
DE (Parliament suggests YES) * (More
than three referenda)
DE (Parliament suggests YES) *
(Number of referenda the same day)
DE (Parliament suggests YES) * (Low
turnout referendum)
Sample restriction
R2
Brier
No. Obs.

-0.1793***
(0.0241)

-0.7686***
(0.0785)

-0.1918***
(0.0511)

-3.1623***
(0.5265)
YES
YES
50.84
10.74

YES
YES
53.47

-0.4511***
(0.1032)

-0.2083***
(0.0512)

-3.9928***
(0.8108)
YES
YES
52.08

YES
YES
53.04

YES
YES
46.73

14.02

5.31

> 3 referenda
0.494
0.1459
4015

0.3312
0.1853
14127

14.50

9.19

0.3273
0.186
14127

> 2 referenda
0.4539
0.1551
6329

0.3308
0.1851
14127

Notes: The dependent variable for all logit estimations is "Constituency accepts referendum". Robust clustered standard errors for cantons
(constituencies) are reported throughout the table. An intercept is always included. DE stands for discrete effect in the predicted probability.
The effects for "Parliament suggests YES", "(Parliament suggests YES) * (Low turnout referendum)", "(Parliament suggests YES) * (More than
one referendum)" represent discrete effects in percentage points for these coefficients when all other variables are evaluated at their median
values. The evaluation of the interaction terms follows Ai and Norton (2001). ***, **, and * indicate a mean significance level of below 1 %,
between 1 and 5 %, and between 5 and 10 %, respectively.
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Refinements
We now refine our specifications as follows: In specification (1) of Table 5, we analyze
the interaction term that represents more than two referenda instead of more than one and
also control for the variable “exactly two referenda on the same day.” Again, the interaction
is positively significant, with a discrete effect over 10 percentage points. These results
demonstrate that most of the previous effects hold especially when there are more referenda
per day. We apply the same approach to specification (2) using our second identification
strategy (“low turnout referendum”), although it should again be stressed that the dataset used
in this estimation is restricted to days with more than two referenda. In specifications (3) and
(4), we go a step further by concentrating on three or more referenda. In all cases, the
interaction term is significantly positive and the discrete effects are larger than in
specifications (1) and (2). Finally, specification (5) runs the interaction directly with the
number of referenda per day (instead of with a dummy) and we thus suppose a change from
one to two referenda for the discrete effect. The interaction term, however, is again
significantly positive.
Because interest groups may also give voting recommendations, our next step is to
investigate their effect (see Table 6) using official interest group voting recommendations
from 1945, when they were first available or officially collected. We have data for three
groups whose interest is the economy, Zentralverband schweizerischer ArbeitgeberOrganisationen, Economiesuisse, and Schweizerischer Gewerbeverband; three that cover
unions, Schweizerischer Gewerkschaftsbund, and Travail.Suisse, which merged with
Vereinigung schweizerischer Angestelltenverbände in 2002; and one that concentrates on
farmers, Schweizerischer Bauernverband. Although other interest groups and regional
organizations exist, these seven are arguably the most important and have the highest number
of active participants. We evaluate only those referenda for which at least one interest group
made an official voting recommendation and construct dummies that identify whether the
interest group recommendations are divergent or whether all interest groups suggested a yes
vote. As Table 6 shows, in specification (1), the interaction term is not significant when
interest groups have divergent opinions and, as expected, only the interaction term for
parliamentary recommendation remains significant.
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Table 6: Parliamentary influence on constituent referenda choices in the presence of interest group
recommendations

More than two interest
groups' suggestions

At least one interest group's suggestion
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Years covered

1945-2009

1945-2009

1945-2009

1945-2009

1945-2009

1945-2009

Parliament suggests YES

2.4929***
(0.1550)

2.6452***
(0.1348)

1.4803***
(0.2107)

1.8857***
(0.1760)

1.5476***
(0.2280)

1.9089***
(0.1895)

(Parliament suggests YES) *
(More than one referendum)

0.3899***
(0.1225)

0.7320***
(0.1709)

0.7842***
(0.1792)

-0.2176*
(0.1278)

-0.3822
(0.2405)

-0.6489***
(0.2410)

More than one referendum
(Parliament suggests YES) * (Low
turnout referendum)

0.3130**
(0.1282)

0.4612***
(0.1533)

0.6384***
(0.1724)

Low turnout referendum

-0.0268
(0.1137)

-0.0983
(0.1482)

-0.6094***
(0.1979)

(Interest groups divergent) *
(More than one referendum)

0.0901
(0.0858)

(Interest groups divergent) *
(Low turnout referendum)
Interest groups divergent

0.0565
(0.2557)
-0.0799
(0.0926)

-0.5250***
(0.0879)

-0.3658***
(0.0861)

0.3053
(0.2869)
-0.0610
(0.1823)

0.9703***
(0.1873)

(All interest groups suggest YES)
* (More than one referendum)

1.0921***
(0.2225)

-0.1689
(0.2553)

(All interest groups suggest YES)
* (Low turnout referendum)

0.3241
(0.2202)
0.9398***
(0.2402)
-0.3396
(0.3189)

-0.0834
(0.2169)

All interest groups suggest YES

1.9742***
(0.2076)

Number of referenda the same
day

0.0887***
(0.0146)

1.1358***
(0.2352)

1.8739***
(0.2554)

0.2910
(0.2546)
2.1422***
(0.2993)

0.0811***
(0.0149)

1.7046***
(0.2653)
0.1212***
(0.0197)

Counterproposal

-0.5686***
(0.0643)

-0.4293***
(0.0781)

-0.5374***
(0.0674)

-0.4096***
(0.0831)

-0.6590***
(0.0740)

-0.4460***
(0.0880)

Turnout

-2.2539***
(0.3417)

-2.1951***
(0.4138)

-2.0763***
(0.3595)

-2.0928***
(0.4258)

-2.0752***
(0.3933)

-2.2142***
(0.4712)

YES
YES
55.23
6.35

YES
YES
56.58

YES
YES
22.32
11.25

YES
YES
25.52

YES
YES
24.07
7.54

YES
YES
23.99

Cantonal Fixed Effects
Decade Fixed Effects
DE Parliament suggests YES
DE (Parliament suggests YES) *
(More than one referendum)
DE (Parliament suggests YES) *
(Low turnout referendum)
Sample restriction

R2
Brier
No. Obs.

5.73

8.98

3.24

>= 1 interest >= 1 interest >= 1 interest >= 1 interest >= 2 interest >= 2 interest
group
group & > 1
group
group & > 1
groups
groups & > 1
referendum
referendum
referendum
0.4005
0.1688
10201

0.4087
0.1666
8385

0.4219
0.1648
10201

0.429
0.1626
8385

0.4158
0.1673
8932

0.4259
0.1643
7516

Notes: The dependent variable for all logit estimations is "Constituency accepts referendum". Robust clustered standard errors for cantons
(constituencies) are reported throughout the table. An intercept is always included. DE stands for discrete effect in the predicted probability. The
effects for "Parliament suggests YES", "(Parliament suggests YES) * (Low turnout referendum)", "(Parliament suggests YES) * (More than one
referendum)" represent discrete effects in percentage points for these coefficients when all other variables are evaluated at their median values.
The evaluation of the interaction terms follows Ai and Norton (2001). ***, **, and * indicate a mean significance level of below 1 %, between 1
and 5 %, and between 5 and 10 %, respectively.

Specification (2) focuses only on the “Low turnout referendum”. The coefficient of the
interaction term for these referenda and interest groups is insignificant while the interaction
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term for the recommendation of the parliament and referenda that do not have the highest
turnout is statistically significant. Thus, the results are consistent even when controlling for
interest groups.
Specifications (3) and (4) test whether citizens react more to interest groups when there
is more than one referendum and interest groups clearly suggest a yes vote. The
insignificance of the interaction with interest groups and number of referenda indicates that
when constituents are rationally bounded, they listen to parliament not interest groups,
possibly because elected politicians are their representatives in the political arena.
Nonetheless, recognizing that the results of the previous specifications could have been
affected if only one interest group made an official recommendation, in specifications (5) and
(6), we attempt to avoid such problems by restricting the sample to those referenda in which
at least two interest groups expressed an opinion. The previously obtained results remain
robust: Constituents follow the rule of thumb of “following parliament’s recommendation”
when more referenda are held the same day and in referenda that did not obtain their focus of
attention.

V.

CONCLUSIONS

This study explores whether a higher level of complexity leads to an increased reliance
on expert knowledge, a topic on which, surprisingly, there seems to be little empirical
evidence. Specifically, we exploit a natural experimental setting of voter practices in
Switzerland, whose institutional environment has been stable since 1848. The dataset for this
unique setting includes information on voting behavior in referenda over a 160-year period
(1848-2009) that spans three centuries. Our results suggest that humans follow simple rules
of thumb by relying on the expert specialist when several simultaneous problems demand
concentrated attention.
We model complexity in two ways: by distinguishing between days with only one
referendum and days with two or more referenda and by focusing only on the latter. First, in
line with our prediction that when more referenda are held on the same day, constituents will
be more likely to seek outside help, we use the number of referenda held on the same day to
identify the influence of parliament on constituent choices. We find evidence that
parliamentary influence is greater when the number of referenda is higher than when there is
only one referendum per day. Second, recognizing that on days with two or more referenda,
constituents incur the same costs for turning up for the first as for the second or third
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referendum on the same day, we use the differences in turnout within constituencies to
identify which referendum of a given day attracted the most attention. Most particularly, by
focusing on referenda with a relatively lower turnout on multiple referenda days, we identify
the influence of parliamentary recommendations when constituents are rationally bounded
and follow simple rules of thumb.
The strength of this empirical design is that we can use the percentage of voter turnout
to directly identify voters’ focus of attention when the choices are multiple. Not only is the
quantitative effect large, but it remains consistently so throughout our numerous robustness
tests and refinements, such as excluding World War I and II, exploring different time periods,
controlling for potential strategic behavior, and making government opinion neutral. We also
control for the effects of interest groups and show that constituents are more likely to listen to
parliament for their recommendations than to interest groups.
Overall, our results show that a bounded rationality framework can throw light on how
people vote and, once the (voting) task is held constant over a long period of time, provide
empirical evidence on procedural rationality. Yet most of the voting literature so far focuses
keenly on why people vote in an attempt to understand the paradox of not voting (see, e.g.,
Feddersen 2004 for an overview). The simplicity of our setting also allows us to identify the
effect of parliamentary voting recommendations on constituents’ real choices while clearly
revealing the preferences of both the constituents and parliament. Most particularly, we
identify a strong invariance in voting behavior that almost resembles a law of qualitative
structure (Newell and Simon 1976).13 We further observe a tendency for voters to follow the
rule of thumb or heuristic that when many problems demand concentrated attention
simultaneously, humans are more likely to rely on expert advice. That this behavior remains
robust over three centuries despite environmental changes implies a simple choice
mechanism that explains a substantial number of observed choices. Our results therefore
provide valuable insights into how humans use limited computational capacity to deal with
differences in information complexity, which always arise in modern societies and when
dealing with political matters We conclude with a quote from Simon (1978) who above all stresses
the importance of seeing attention as a scarce resource: “[When] important new policies must be

formulated, public and official attention must be focused on one or a few matters. Other
concerns, no matter how pressing, must wait their turn on the agenda... The management of
13

Simon (1990) makes a statement about psychology that can also be applied to other social sciences:
“Psychology does not much resemble classical mechanics, nor should it aim to do so. Its laws are, and
will be, limited in range and generality and will be mainly qualitative” (p. 2).
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attention and tracing indirect consequences of action are two of the basic issues of procedural
rationality that confront a modern society... “Reasonable men” reach “reasonable”
conclusions in circumstances where they have no prospect of applying classical models of
substantive rationality. We know only imperfectly how they do it... the study of procedural
rationality in circumstances where attention is scarce, where problems are immensely
complex, and where crucial information is absent presents a host of challenging and
fundamental research problems to anyone who is interested in the rational allocation of scarce
resources” (pp. 13-14).
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Table A1: Data description and sources
1848-2009
Variable

Description & Source

1848-1945

1946-2009

Available
since

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

1848

0.4907

0.4999

0.4856

0.4999

0.4924

0.5000

Parliament suggests YES Indicator variable: Parliamentary majority suggests to vote YES. Federal Statistical Office
and Swissvotes Database.

1848

0.7031

0.4569

0.7887

0.4083

0.6743

0.4687

More than one
referendum

Indicator variable: More than one referendum on the same day. Author construction.

1848

0.7334

0.4422

0.4718

0.4993

0.8212

0.3832

More than two referenda
More than three
referenda

Indicator variable: More than two referenda on the same day. Author construction.
Indicator variable: More than three referenda on the same day. Author construction.

1848
1848

0.4692
0.3001

0.4991
0.4583

0.2042
0.0916

0.4032
0.2884

0.5582
0.3701

0.4966
0.4829

Low turnout referendum

Indicator variable: Turnout in constituency is not highest when there is more than one
referendum on the same day (takes a value of 0 by default when there is only one
referendum on the same day). Author construction.

1884

0.4822

0.4997

0.2492

0.4326

0.5466

0.4979

Number of referenda the
same day

Number of referenda on the same day. Federal Statistical Office and Swissvotes
Database.

1848

2.8810

1.8827

2.0850

1.9629

3.1480

1.7768

Counterproposal

Indicator variable: Referendum is a parliamentary counterproposal to an initiative.
Federal Statistical Office and Swissvotes Database.

1848

0.0631

0.2432

0.0493

0.2165

0.0678

0.2514

Turnout

Number of valid votes in the constituency divided by number of eligible voters. Federal
Statistical Office.

1884

0.4615

0.1506

0.5526

0.1970

0.4363

0.1236

Government neutral

Indicator variable: Government does not give a voting recommendation. Federal
Statistical Office and Swissvotes Database.

1848

0.2531

0.4348

0.4577

0.4983

0.1845

0.3879

Interest groups divergent

Indicator variable: One or more major interest groups offer divergent voting
recommendations. Federal Statistical Office and Swissvotes Database.

1945

0.4816

0.4997

0.4828

0.4997

All interest groups
suggest YES

Indicator variable: All major interest groups suggest a YES vote. Federal Statistical Office
and Swissvotes Database.

1945

0.3679

0.4823

0.3664

0.4818

Constituency accepts
referendum

Indicator variable: Constituency (canton) accepts the referendum. Federal Statistical
Office and Swissvotes Database.

Notes: Unweighted descriptive statistics. Data sources indicated next to variable descriptions.
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Figure S1 (supplementary material not intended for publication): Extract of federal legislation in 1877

Notes: See BBl 1877 I 265, Botschaft des Bundesrathes an die hohe Bundesversammlung, betreffend die: Frage, ob Vorlagen an das
Schweizervolk mit einer erläuternden Botschaft zu begleiten seien [Translate the title into English here] (14 February, 1877) provided
by the Schweizerisches Bundesarchiv.
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